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Abstract - This paper presents a directed signature scheme with the property that 
the signature can be verified only with the help of signer or signature receiver. 
We also propose its applications to share verification of signatures and to 
threshold cryptosystems. 
1. Introduction 
To avoid forgery and ensure confidentially of message, it has been a common practice for centuries 
for the sender of the message to put his identification marks, i.e. signature on the letter and then to seal it 
in an envelope, before handing it over to a deliverer. In electronic-era, physical signatures are not 
workable and the digital signatures are the cryptographic answer to the problems of information security 
and authenticity. W.Diffie and M.Hellman originally defined digital signatures. Digital signatures are in 
some sense similar to hands written signature. A hand written signature is verified by comparing it to 
others authentic signatures. In contrast to hand written signatures, which are independent of message, 
digital signature must somehow reflect both the message and the signer.  
In order to achieve this requirement, a signer who holds secret information, generates digital 
signature, using secret information. To verify digital signature the receiver applies a publicly known 
algorithm. Thus, a signature scheme allows a user with a public key and a corresponding private key to 
sign a document in such a way that everyone using public key can verify the signature of the document, 
but no one else can forge the signature. This property is called as self-authentication, which is necessarily 
required for some applications of digital signatures such as certificate official announcements issued by 
some authority.  
On the other hands, there are so many situations, when the signed message may be sensitive to the 
signature receiver. Signatures on medical records, tax information and most personal/business 
transactions are such situations. Such signatures are called as directed signatures [1, 2, 9, 10, and 12]. In 
directed signature scheme, the signature receiver has full control over the signature verification process. 
Nobody can check the validity of signature without his cooperation.  
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The concept of directed signatures was first presented by C.H.Lim and P.J. Lee [10]. It is a 
construction based on the GQ signature scheme [8]. D.Chaum [2] introduced the concept of designated 
confirmation. Later T.Okamoto [12] presented a more practical construction of designated confirmer 
signatures. 
This paper proposes a directed signature scheme and its applications. In this scheme, any third 
party can check the signature validity with the help of signature receiver or the signer as well. Both the 
signer and signature receiver have full control over the signature verification process. In other words, they 
are independent to prove the validity of the signature to any third party, whenever necessary.  The paper is 
organized as follows: - 
The section-2 presents some basic tools. Section-3 describes a Directed Signature Scheme.  The 
security of the proposed scheme is discussed in section-4. Section – 5 is an illustration. A directed 
signature with threshold verification is discussed in section - 6. An application to threshold 
cryptosystem is discussed in section-7. 
2. Preliminaries      
2.1. Preliminary Settings 
Throughout this paper we use the following system setting.  
• A prime modulous p, where 2 511 <  p  < 2 512 ; 
• A prime modulous q, where 2 159 <  q  < 2 160 and q is a divisor of p – 1; 
• A number g, where   g      k (p –1) /q mod p, k is random integer with 1  k  p –1 
such that g >1; (g is a generator of order q in Zp*). 
• A collision free one-way hash function h [15]; 
The parameters p, q, g and h are common to all users. We assume that every user A chooses a 
random Ax ∈ Zq and computes Ay  = Αxg   mod p. Here Ax  is the private key of A and Ay  is the public 
key of A. For our purpose, we use Schnorr’s signature scheme [13] and Shamir’s threshold scheme [14]. 
These basic tools are briefly described below. 
2.2. Schnorr’s signature scheme 
In this scheme, the signature of A on message m are given by ( Ar , AS ),  
where,  Ar    =  h ( g Ak  mod p, m) and  AS   =  Ak  − Ax . Ar  mod  p. 
     Here random Ak ∈ Zq   is private to A. The signature are verified by checking the equality    
                            Ar    =  h  ( g AS    y Ar  mod p , m ) . 
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2.3. Shamir’s threshold scheme 
Shamir’s (t, n) threshold secret sharing signature scheme is a scheme to distribute a secret key K into 
n users in such a way that any t users can cooperate to reconstruct K but a collusion of t – 1 or less users 
reveal nothing about the secret.  Shamir’s scheme is based on Lagrange interpolation in a field. To 
implement it, a polynomial f of degree t – 1 is randomly chosen in Zq such that f (0) = K. Each user i is 
given a public identity iu and a secret share f ( iu ). Now any t out of n shareholders can reconstruct the 
secret K =  f (0), by pooling their shares and using 
                       f (0)           =      q
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Here for simplicity the authorized subset of t users consists of shareholders i for i =1,2,3…t. 
3. New directed signature scheme 
Suppose that user A wants to generate a signature on message m so that only receiver B can directed 
verify the signature and that B as well as A can independently prove the validity of signature to any third 
party C, whenever necessary. Our construction of such a signature scheme is based on Schnorr’s signature 
scheme. The signing and verification processes are as follows. 
3.1. Signature generation by A 
 (a). A picks random 
1a
K and 
2a
K  ∈  Zq and computes  
                  WB    =  g 2aK−  mod p and VB      =     g 1aK .  yB 2aK mod p. 
Here yB   is the public key of the signature receiver B. 
(b). Using a one- way hash function h, A computes a secret value rA        =     h (g 1aK , m). 
 
(c). A computes  AS     =    1aK + Ax . Ar   mod  q.  
Here Ax  is the private key of the signer. { AS , WB , VB , m} is the  signature of A on the 
message m. 
3.2. Signature verification by B 
(a). Using his private key Bx , B computes R = VB (WB ) Bx  mod p  and   recovers Ar   =  h (R , m). 
(b). B checks the following congruence for a valid signature   g AS     ≡
?
  R. yA Ar  mod p. 
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                       If hold then { AS , WB , VB , m} is a valid signature. 
3.3. Proof of validity to C 
In this scheme, both the signer and signature receiver can independently prove the validity of 
signature to any third party, whenever necessary. This sub-section describes the protocol using which the 
signer and the signature receiver can prove the validity of signature. 
3.3.1. Proof of validity by A to C 
1.  A computes VC         =         g 1aK .  y C  2aK   mod p and sends to C. 
2.  C uses VC in place VB to checks the validity of signature by using his secret key. The signature 
verification process will remain same as in sub-section 3.2. 
3.3.2. Proof of validity by B to C 
1. B picks random K ∈ Zq and computes   
                 WC     =    g K−  mod p, VC         =      R . yC K   mod p,  and sends to C. 
2.  C uses (WC , VC ) in place ( WB , VB ) to checks the validity of signature by using his secret key. 
The signature verification process will remain same as in sub-section 3.2. 
4. Security discussions 
In this sub-section, we shall discuss the security of proposed Directed Signature Scheme.  
(a). Can one retrieve the secret key Ax  , integer 1aK  from the equation 
                                          AS     =   1aK + Ax . Ar  mod q ? 
Here the number of unknown parameters is two. The number of equation is one, so it is 
computationally infeasible for a forger to collect the secret Ax  , integer 1K  from this equation. 
Obviously, this is also again computationally infeasible for a forger to collect any information. 
(b). Can one impersonate the signer? 
A forger may try to impersonate the signer by randomly selecting two integers 1K and 2K  ∈  Zq 
and calculate 
                        WB   =  g 2K−  mod p,  VB      =   g 1K .  yB 2K   mod p,  rA     = h (g 1K , m). 
But without knowing the secret key Ax , it is difficult to generate a valid AS  to satisfy the 
verification equation   g AS       ≡
?
     [R. yA Ar   ]     mod p. 
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(c). Can one forge a signature { AS , WB , VB ,   m}  by the equation   g AS   ≡
?
   [R. yA Ar   ] mod p? 
A forger may randomly select an integer R
 
and then computes the hash value Ar  such that  
                                      Ar    =    h (R , m) mod q. 
Obviously, to compute the integer AS  is equivalent to solving the discrete logarithm problem. On 
the other hand, the forger can randomly select Ar and AS  first, then try to determine a value R
* 
, that 
satisfy the signature verification equation.  
Thus these attacks will not be successful. 
5. Illustration  
We choose smaller parameters to illustrate the scheme. Taking   p  =   23, q  =  11 and g  =  3.The 
secret and public key of users is as follow---- 
    User                                      Secret key                         public key 
      A                                         4                               12 
      B                           7                                       2 
      C                                         6                               16 
 
5.1. Signature generation by A to B 
(a). A picks random 
1a
K  =  9 ,and 
2a
K  =  5   and computes WB  = 16 , VB    =      1. 
(b). Using a one way hash function h, A computes  rA    =  10, AS   =   5.  
 (c).  A sends {5, 16, 1, m} to B as his/her signature on the message m. 
5.2. Signature verification by B 
(a). B computes R  =   18, recovers  Ar    =     h (18, m)      =         10. 
(b). B checks the following congruence for a valid signature 3 5     ≡
?
   18 .12
 
10
 
mod 23. This holds. 
5.3. Proof of validity by A to C 
1. A computes VC         =         16 and sends to C. 
2. C computes R      =      16 .16 6 mod 23   =    18. 
3. C uses VC in place VB to checks the validity of signature by using his secret key. The signature 
verification process will remain same as in sub-section 3.2. 
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5.4. Proof of validity by B to C 
1.B picks random  K    =   8  and computes WC   =     4, VC      =      9,and sends to C. 
2. C computes R      =         9 .4 6 mod 23      =        18. 
3. C uses (WC , VC) in place ( WB , VB ) to checks the validity of signature by using his secret key. The 
signature verification process will remain same as in sub-section 3.2. 
7. Application to shared verification of signatures 
The proposed directed signature scheme can be used to design a signature scheme with 
threshold verification. A signer can generate a signature on the message m to the organization R 
in such a way that any subset HR of k users of a designated group GR of n users can determine the 
validity of the signature but any k –1or less users cannot verify the signature The construction of 
directed signature scheme with threshold verification is based on Shamir’s threshold scheme 
[14]. We assume that every user i in the designated group GR possesses a private key iRx  and 
public key 
iR
y .This scheme consists of the following steps. 
7. 1. Signature  generation by A 
 (a). A picks random 
1a
K and 
2a
K  ∈  Zq and computes  
        WR   =   g 2aK−  mod p  and VR    =    g 1aK .  mod p. 
 (b). Using a one- way hash function h, A computes a secret value  
    rA       =    h (VR  , m) and  AS     = 1aK + Ax . Ar     mod q.  
Here Ax  is the private key of the signer.  
(c). A selects a polynomial  f R (x)   =     1aK  + b1x +….b k -1 x 
k -1
 mod q, with  
1a
K =   f R(0). 
(d). A computes a public value
iR
v
  
for each member of the group GR , as, 
                          
iR
v   =   fR ( iRu ). 2ai
K
Ry  mod p. 
Here 
iR
y is public key and 
iR
u
 
is the public value associated with each user i in the group GR. 
(e). A sends { AS , WR , m , niRiv 1}{ = } to the group GR as the signature of A on the message m. 
7.2. Signature verification by the organization R 
Any subset HR of k users from a designated group GR of n users can verify the signature. We assume 
that there is a designated combiner, which collects partial computations from each user in HR and 
determine the validity of signature. The verifying process is as follows. 
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(a) Each user i ∈ HR recovers his/her secret share, as,   fR ( iRu ) =   iRv iR
x
RW mod  p. 
(b) Each user i ∈ HR modifies his/her shadow, as, iRMS  =     fR ( iRu ). quu
u
ji
i
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R
t
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. 
(c) Each user i ∈ HR uses his/her modified shadow, iRMS , and calculate the partial result iRR ,as , 
                                
iR
R   =   g iRMS mod q, 
and sends to the combiner. 
(d). The combiner computes R
 
, as,  R
       
=      pR
k
i
Ri
mod
1
∏
=
 and recovers  rA  , as, 
rA     =   h (  R     ,  m) mod q. 
(e). The combiner checks the following congruence for a valid signature 
                                                          g AS    ≡
?
  R
  
. 
Ar
Ay  mod p. 
           If hold then { AS , WR , m , niRiv 1}{ = } is a valid signature. 
7.3.Remarks 
The proposed scheme has the following characteristics: 
• There is no need of a trusted SDC, while in many threshold signature schemes, there is a 
trusted SDC that determines the security parameters and also distributes the secrets shares 
to each user in the system. 
• The signer is free to decide the security parameters and secrets shares to each user. 
• The signer decides the security parameters and secrets shares at the time of signing. 
• The signer can use the security parameters and secrets shares as one-time secrets. There 
is no need to fix them. 
• The signer can change the threshold value k to sign another documents. 
• The only requirement is that every user i in the designated group GR possesses a private 
and public key pair  (
iR
x , 
iR
y ). 
8. Application to threshold cryptosystem 
Threshold cryptosystem is society – oriented cryptosystem. This is useful, when a policy requires the 
consent of more than one person. The organization has a single public key. The secret key is distributed 
among the users of organization in such a way that any k users can determine the policy, but when any k – 
1 users work together, they cannot receive any information about the system secret. Hence any k - 1 users 
cannot determines the policy.  
 8 
Desmedt. Y. and Frankel.Y. [4, 5, 6] developed the concepts of threshold cryptosystems. They’re 
some weaknesses in these cryptosystem, given as follows: 
• The group secret key is fixed; any subgroup of k dishonest users can recovers the group 
secret key and can be harmful for the system. 
• The security parameters are also fixed. The secrets shares determine during the system set 
up. Any change in-group member or security policy requires adjusting group member’s 
secret share accordingly. 
The proposed directed signature scheme can be used to make a threshold cryptosystem to sort out all 
the above weaknesses. 
Suppose a user A wants to encrypt the message m so that any k users from designated group GR of n 
users should cooperate to recover the message. The encryption and decryption key K for sender and the 
receiving group GR can be recovered from VR and R respectively. The sender A broadcasts {{ AS , WR , c, 
n
iRi
v 1}{ = } to the group GR ,where  c    =    EK (m) and   K    =     h (VR). Thus, any k members can recover R 
and then decryption key K  =  h (R ). They can decrypt the message as  m   =  DK (c). 
The proposed threshold cryptosystem has the following advantages over the cryptosystems based on 
the concept of Desmedt and Frankel. 
• The group secret is not fixed and can be change for each further communications. 
• There is no need of fixed set up. The sender determines everything at the time of 
encryption. 
• An individual can send cipher text to any chosen group with any desired security policy.  
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